The idea of deregulating shopping hours brings strong opposition from many groups in the society. Surprisingly, even many consumers oppose deregulation. The paper rationalizes this behavior by considering heterogeneous consumers who differ in their earnings abilities. If a majority of families has two income earners, long opening hours become essential and the regulation of shopping hours tends to be eliminated. If most families are single income households, the regulation may be imposed in order to keep prices low. Taking the repercussions on the labor supply decision into account, multiple equilibria can be explained.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SHOPPING HOUR REGULATION
While in recent years some countries have followed the path of liberalization and deregulation, most European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, and Norway still impose severe restrictions on shopping hours. 1 In many countries there is significant opposition to deregulation which comes not only from small shop owners who fear a change in the market structure or from labor unions which fear the loss of influence because the number of non-unionized workers would increase. Surprisingly, many consumers also oppose deregulation. New opportunities offered by longer shopping hours, such as shopping at the most convenient times, searching for the lowest price or best quality, or shopping with the whole family in less crowded facilities, are often only welcomed by a minority. According to a large German survey , for example, more than 56 percent of all consumers have no interest at all in liberalized shopping hours. 2 Obviously, for many consumers who oppose deregulation, the fear that prices might rise with longer opening hours outweighs the advantages of more liberal shopping hours. Indeed, some 50 percent of German consumers expect that higher prices will follow deregulation (Munz, Täger and Vogler-Ludwig 1995, p. 16) and there is empirical evidence for Canada that larger retail stores have in fact increased their prices after deregulation (Tanguay, Valée and Lanoie 1995) . This paper wants to shed some light on the political economy of divergent consumer interests and on the regulation which results from this. We argue that restricted shopping hours may help maintain the low consumer prices which are in the interest of single income households with plenty of time for day time shopping. However, this comes at the expense of households with two income earners who, for obvious reasons, have a higher preference for unrestricted shopping hours. In an extension of our basic model we consider the repercussion of regulation on households' labor market participation. Since expected shopping hour 1 European countries where there are almost no limitations are the UK, Portugal and Sweden. 2 In Switzerland, the consumers' opposition against longer shopping hours became evident in a series of referenda. A new labor law that (among other things) proposed a liberalization of shopping hours was rejected by a majority of 67% of the voters in December 1996 (Tagesanzeiger, December 2, 1996) . In June 1996, three cantons put proposals for liberalized shopping hours to the vote -all of them were rejected, in Freiburg by 78%, in Winterthur by 71%, and in St. Gallen by 65% of the voters (Schaffhauser Nachrichten, June 10, 1996) . Since referenda are known for fostering discussion and for enhancing the dissipation of information among citizens (cf. Frey, 1994) these high figures suggest that better informed citizens are not less hostile towards liberalization.
restrictions make it more costly to set up double income households it can be argued that the restriction on shopping hours produces its own clientele, namely single income families. This tends to stabilize the regulatory regime. In this respect, the regulation of shopping hours can be seen as a special case of a much broader theme. Many regulatory interventions have feedback effects on individual decisions. Anticipating these regulations triggers self-stabilizing incentive effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we will give a short survey of the literature. Section III presents the setup of a model with heterogeneous shoppers. In Section IV, we analyze the market outcome and the decision on shopping hour regulation.
Section V considers an extension of the model, where the labor supply of households who take the possible future regulation of shopping hours into consideration becomes endogenous. In Section VI, we will highlight some welfare implications, and Section VII concludes.
II. RECENT STUDIES ON SHOPPING HOUR REGULATION
In recent years, there has been a series of studies on the economics of restricted shopping hours. Little attention, however, has been given to the political process that implements and preserves this regulation. Most studies in the field discuss the efficiency of trading restrictions.
Like the present study, Kay and Morris (1987) show that inefficient equilibria with excessive opening on Sundays may exist. In contrast to our model, however, their conclusion is drawn from a model with homogeneous consumers. 3 Clemenz (1994) shows the possibility of excessive trading hours in the case of a pure monopolist. De Meza (1994) focuses on a setting with imperfect competition where shops earn profits on marginal consumers; lifting the trading restrictions may distort the economy even further from first best as shops replace profits with costs as they try to keep their competitive position through longer opening hours. Clemenz (1990) argues that a reduction of shopping hours may impede the proper functioning of markets if consumers have imperfect knowledge about prices. 3 Kay and Morris doubt that, under their assumptions, inefficient equilibria are empirically important. Ferris (1991) uses a model of spatial competition in which the market allocation is distorted by externalities leading to socially excessive opening hours. In order to attract marginal consumers, shops prefer extending opening hours to lowering prices, as the latter strategy reduces revenues from intramarginal (i.e. locally near) customers. Socially, however, reducing prices would be a less wasteful instrument of competition. In this context, Ferris emphasizes that a decentralized political decision on shopping hours can improve on the market allocation. Our paper, like that of Ferris, is based on shopping externalities and highlights the political economy aspect. However, we model the political process explicitly and analyze the feedback effects that are caused by anticipated future regulations. Allowing for heterogeneous consumers, we will show in the following that the feedback effects from the political process are a major source of an inefficient allocation of resources and of an inefficient choice of regulation.
III. THE MODEL
To allow for heterogeneous consumers our model splits the population in two groups. The first group consist of double income families. With both adults working during the day, these families will have a high valuation for late shopping hours. They are willing to bear higher costs if shops are open late. The second group is characterized by households with only one income earner. As the second adult can go shopping during the day, these families have no urgent need for long opening hours and will dislike higher prices.
In stage 1 of the game, the population decides on the regulation of shopping hours. If the majority votes in favor of a regulation, shopping hours are restricted. If no regulation is imposed, firms are free to keep their shops open at night or on Sundays. In stage 2, each shopkeeper decides on his opening hours, hires the necessary number of clerks and sells his goods to the consumers. The decisions and outcomes in this second stage, of course, will depend on whether a regulation was imposed at the first stage.
Not only does the market outcome depend on the regulation, but the regulation itself is determined by the composition of the population. With many single income families in the population, it is very likely that shopping hours will be regulated. This future regulation creates a disincentive for some potential second income earners to take a job. Hence, we introduce stage 0 where the families decide on their labor supply. In particular, they decide whether only one adult or both will work. This will depend, among other things, on their expectations about future regulation. Figure 1 summarizes the time structure of the model. where the decision on regulation can be taken as given. Hence, we have to distinguish between the cases of a laissez-faire situation and an economy with regulated opening hours. However, before we go to the market interaction in more detail, we have to specify more precisely supply and demand side in our market game.
Demand Side
Suppose there is only one bundle of goods ('the good') that is sold in the shops. Each family in the economy demands one unit of this good and the total number of families is normalized to unity. Differentiation of consumers comes only from the labor supply decision at stage 0. At stage 2, the division of the population in single income and double income families is fixed. Let s denote the share of double income families; 1 − s is the share of single income families. (Due to the normalization to unity, these two variables also describe the total number of families in each group.)
The consumption of the good provides a family with the utility U a p = − if the family can purchase the good at its preferred time. 
4 The different time constraints on consumers' search implies that the exact bundle of goods differs between consumers. For simplicity, we will not explicitly model the underlying search process. 5 By assumption of a uniform demand, we neglect the income effects. If high income families purchase a larger set of goods, the disutility d may be increasing in income. As this would not change our results qualitatively, it is appropriate to work with this simplifying assumption.
Under reasonable conditions, the number of sales will be concave in the number of clerks (β < 1). The parameter π j describes the efficiency of labor that may change due to the regulation of shopping hours. The parameter π j is the average purchasing probability for each customer. If customers do not spend time on finding out about the products, each contact with a customer would immediately result in a purchase (π j = 1). The more the customers search for the appropriate goods bundle, the lower the share of successful customer contacts. Under laissez faire ( j LF = ), shops can be open long hours, and, in equilibrium, indeed some of them will. Therefore, even double income families can search intensively for the purchase. We assume that there is no difference in the search processes of single and double income families.
Each customer has a purchasing probability of π. Hence, the aggregate purchasing probability
under laissez faire. If regulation restricts the opening hours to the daytime ( j R = ), the double income families are forced to make their purchases after a shorter search period. From the shop owners' point of view, this constraint results in a higher purchasing probability π for double income families (π π > ). Because of time pressure, these customers are less likely to require time and advice from the clerks which is not followed by a purchase. As single income and double income families enter a shop at random, the average purchasing probability under regulation can be written as
With regulated shopping hours, double income families increase the average sales per customer contact and, therefore, make clerks more productive, i.e. π π R LF > . Note, however, that this increase in the clerks' efficiency is not necessarily a social gain as the double income families suffer the disutility d from the constrained shopping opportunities.
Denoting the clerks' wage rate by w and using equation (1) . For simplicity, the wage rate w is assumed to be constant across shopping hours.
In addition to labor, shops will need some factors whose costs are dependent on whether a shop is open at all during a particular period. Examples of this type of costs are the shop owner's opportunity cost or the shop's electricity bill. Like wages, the fixed cost K is assumed to be constant across different times of the day, i.e., K is the same for day or night opening. 6 With free market entry and a large number of shops, each shop operates at its minimum average cost which is reached at the output level
Due to the higher efficiency of clerks, a single shop makes more sales when shopping hours are
The optimal labor input of a single shop is not affected by the regulatory environment:
The Direct Price Effect
The contestability of the market ensures that each shop can only charge its minimum average cost:
6 The shops' cost structure has the merit that it enables us to think of a shop which opens both day and night as consisting of two separate units. Note that our model does not consider possible efficiency gains from liberalized shopping hours which may occur because shops' fixed cost can be spread over longer opening hours. These gains would affect double income and single income families symmetrically and, therefore, are unlikely to affect the following political economy analysis of regulation as long as they are not too substantial. In a study of the effects of liberalized opening hours in the Netherlands, the Centraal Planbureau (1995, p. 31) estimates that the higher labor costs overcompensated the reduction in capital costs and led to an increase in real prices. For a diverging view, see Finsinger and Graf von der Schulenburg (1989).
Prices above that level would immediately attract a new shop and demand would drop to zero.
A price below average cost leads to losses. 7 Due to the lower labor productivity under laissez faire, shops are forced to charge their customers higher prices. The benefit of regulation, i.e. the higher productivity, is handed over to the customers through competitive forces: p p LF R > .
The higher price disadvantages single income families who do not make use of longer opening hours. The laissez faire scenario, however, may be attractive to the double income families as long as the more convenient opening hours compensate for the higher price.
The Clerks' Wage Effect
Besides the direct price effect, there is a second price increasing effect of deregulation.
Deregulation enhances the total labor demand for clerks and, therefore, may increase the shops' wage costs.
As total demand is normalized to unity and each shop sells 
. While each shopkeeper may take the wage rate as given, in the aggregate, additional demand requires higher wages. To simplify the further analysis and to avoid feedback effects that are not central to our point we assume that the pool of clerks is distinct from the households which consume the goods and constitute a negligible fraction of the voters. In equilibrium, supply and demand for clerks have to be equalized:
Deregulation of shopping hours implies an outward shift in labor demand and, therefore, an increase in the equilibrium wage for clerks: w w R LF < . As the wage costs affect the price level positively [cf. eq. (4)], labor market adjustment is a second reason for arguing that prices increase as a consequence of shopping hour deregulation. 9
Households' Labor Participation, Clerks' Wages and the Consumer Price Level
Before we turn to an explicit analysis of the households' labor supply decision, we will analyze how the price level and the clerks' wage are affected by the labor participation in the society, i.e. by the relation of single income and double income households.
First, we turn to the comparative static effects on the wage level. With laissez faire, changes in the share of double income families (s) obviously have no effect on the equilibrium wage for clerks. With regulation of shopping hours, however, the composition of society affects the productivity of clerks. The higher the share of double income families, the more people are forced to make their purchases under time pressure. This will lead to changes in the clerks' productivity and the shops' labor demand. The way in which the share of double income families affects the equilibrium wage of clerks can be seen from an implicit differentiation of
9 The recent moderate deregulation in Germany is estimated to generate an employment increase of 1.4 percent (full time equivalents) and a revenue increase of 2.3 percent in the retail sector. In Sweden, employment went up 1.5 percent and revenues even increased by 5 percent after the deregulation of shopping hours in 1972 [Täger, Vogler-Ludwig and Munz (1995, pp. 323-329, 490-497) ]. It should be noted that price increases are the only source of additional revenue in our model. Empirical figures may also include the demand increase from additional employment and the substitution effect of consumers who were constrained in their shopping opportunities before deregulation. With regard to the price effect, empirical figures will also include countervailing effects such as economies of scale and market power in the retailing industry that are not considered in our model. The Canadian experience shows a price increase of 5 percent after deregulation [Tanguay, Valée and Lanoie (1995) ] which is in line with our arguments. Sweden experienced a moderate decline in prices (0.6 percent) which indicates that the countervailing effects were dominant.
As regulation reduces the labor intensity of sales due to the different purchasing behavior of double income families, equilibrium wages for clerks will fall in the size of the double income group.
This result enables us to analyze the effect of the labor participation rate on the price level. For this purpose, we define the price difference between a laissez-faire economy and a regulated economy as ∆p p p LF R ≡ − . By taking the derivative with respect to s we obtain the positive relationship:
The laissez-faire price is independent of the number of double income households. With regulated shopping hours, however, an increase in the share of double income families affects the price level in two ways. First, there is the direct effect on the price level due to a change in the share of double income households which leads to less searching and information gathering by consumers (first term in brackets). Secondly, the price level is even further reduced by the indirect effect via a lower aggregate demand for clerks and, hence, lower wage bills (second term in brackets). The overall effect is clearly positive. If shopping hours are restricted, each additional double income family slightly reduces the price level further away from the laissezfaire price.
As single income households do not benefit from longer opening hours but suffer from the price increase, this group will clearly reject any deregulation of shopping hours. Double income families also suffer from the price increase but this group also receives a benefit from the better shopping opportunities. In the next step, we will focus on the double income group and on the outcome in a voting game.
Voting on Shopping Hour Regulation
The laissez-faire solution without any regulations on shopping hours allows each consumer to go shopping at his or her preferred time. Double income families receive a consumer surplus of ensure that double income families indeed prefer shops with long opening hours, the disutility from daytime shopping has to be high enough to compensate for the price difference:
We already know that the price difference is positively related to the size of the double income group. Hence, there might be a critical size of the double income group % s above which the price difference becomes big enough to make even double income families vote in favor of regulation. The critical size % s , below which the double income earners strictly prefer a laissezfaire environment is implicitly given by d p s = ∆ ( %). Note that such a critical size is a possibility, not a certainty. Even in a pure double income society (s = 1), the price difference may not be big enough to overcompensate the advantage of longer shopping hours (d).
We now turn to the decision about the regulation itself. We assume that the decision is made by majority voting which allows the median voter to achieve her preferred amount of regulation. At this stage of the game, voters are only distinguished by the family's income status. If the median voter is a member of the single income group (s < 0 5 . ), shopping hours will be regulated. This group benefits from the decreasing prices and sees no harm in the limited shopping opportunities. If the majority of voters, however, belongs to double income families (s ≥ 0 5 . ), the decision depends on whether the size of the double income group exceeds the critical value. Restrictions on the opening hours will be rejected if the lower prices due to regulation cannot make up for the disutility from inconvenient shopping times (0 5 . % ≤ < s s ). Conversely, although the majority, the double income group will impose shopping hour restrictions if its size is sufficiently large ( % s s ≤ ≤ 1). Here, the price effect dominates the advantages of longer opening hours.
An interesting feature of this regulation is how the benefit varies with changes in the population's distribution over the two family types. If almost all families belong to the single income group (s → 0), there is little benefit from regulating shopping hours. As there are only very few families who go shopping in the evening, the overall effect on the average time needed for a customer and the clerks' wage level is negligible. As the share of double income families increases, customers face rising prices and the regulation of shopping hours becomes an important policy intervention for the single income group. Once the median voter position moves over to the double income group, the single income families will have an even greater interest in limiting the opening hours but will lack the power to impose this regulation. Once in the median voter's position, the double income group pursues a laissez-faire policy. Only when the price effect becomes noticeable, i.e. the share of double income families exceeds the critical value % s , will regulation of shopping hours be again introduced. In this case, the regulation of shopping hours acts as a co-ordinating device for double income families who are forced to shop during the daytime and thus keep overall prices low. 10
Not surprisingly, the majority decision on the regulation of shopping hours cannot ensure an optimal outcome. 11 If the median voter comes from the single income group, she will neglect the disutility of double income families who are forced to shop during the daytime. And a median voter from the double income group will neglect the full benefit of lower prices for single income families. An additional distortion arises with potential regulation once the families' labor decision is considered as endogenous.
V. SINGLE INCOME FAMILIES AND DOUBLE INCOME FAMILIES: THE LABOR SUPPLY
Whether the second adult in a family takes a job or stays at home depends both on his or her job opportunities (i.e. on the opportunity costs of staying at home) and on the expected regulation regime. As has become clear in the previous section, these two elements are closely linked. The decision to take a job hinges on the possibility of shopping at a convenient time and the decision on the regulation in turn depends on the size of the double income group. In this section, we want to discuss the repercussion of regulation on the households' labor supply.
Of course, it would be hard to believe that the regulation of shopping hours alone has significant effects on the labor supply large enough to shift the median voter. However, limiting the opening hours is only one example from a set of regulations that may discourage 10 This feature may explain why we observe regulation of shopping hours both in countries where the median voter belongs to the double income group and in countries where there are only very few double income families. 11 For a detailed welfare analysis, see Section VI. Suppose that the families can be ordered with respect to the job opportunities of the potential second income earner. Define y as the net benefit that accrues to a household from having a second earner, i.e. the benefit after subtracting the disutility of labor. For simplicity, we assume that these job opportunities in terms of potential wage income are uniformly distributed over all families on the interval y y y ∈ [ , ] . As the total number of families is normalized to unity, the density of job opportunities is given by f y y y
In a first step, we analyze the case where the individuals expect no limitation on the shopping hours. 12 In this case, a family with the income characteristic y compares the utility under the two available options. Either one adult stays at home or both take up work: We will assume that there are at least some households who never consider becoming double income families and that labor participation is always profitable for those families with the best job opportunities ( y y < << 0 ). Otherwise, society would consist of one type of families only which is a trivial case.
In a second step, we derive the families' labor supply decisions when households expect Consider the first case where s s R LF < < ½ which holds to the left of line AB. This would imply that even if the individuals expect a laissez-faire policy, the number of double income families would be too small to gain the median voter position. As the single income group is the majority and dislikes the high prices under laissez faire, regulation will be imposed.
Hence, a low labor participation according to s R and a regulation of shopping hours is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In the second case (s s R LF < < ½ , between lines AB and CD), the median voter changes from the single income to the double income group depending on the initial expectations. If all households expect a regulated environment, labor participation will remain low. The single income group gains the majority position and will indeed impose regulation of shopping hours.
Hence, regulation is one feasible equilibrium in this scenario. The story is slightly more complex for the laissez-faire equilibrium. Recall that the double income families prefer deregulation only if the size of the double income group does not exceed the critical value % s .
For s s LF < %, laissez faire can be established as an equilibrium. If all households expect a laissezfaire policy to be implemented, labor participation will be high and the median voter comes from a double income family. As these families strictly gain from laissez faire, opening hours will not be regulated. Hence, laissez faire is the second feasible equilibrium in this scenario, if the share of double income families remains below the critical value. In the area BEFD, both laissez faire and regulation can be rationalized as fulfilled expectations equilibria. If the share of the double income group, however, exceeds the critical value ( % s s LF < ), households anticipate that they will have no incentive to impose restrictions once it comes to the regulatory decision.
Again, the only rational expectations equilibrium is a low labor participation in a regulated economy (in the area AEFC).
Figure 2: The Feasible Equilibria
In the third scenario, the double income group has always the majority decision whatever is initially expected to occur at the regulation stage (½ < s s 
VI. WELFARE
As a last point in our formal analysis we want to highlight the welfare implications of shopping hour regulation. We will address the two major issues here separately. First, are shops open too long or is the regulation of opening hours too tight? Secondly, can we expect labor market participation to be optimal in the face of potential future regulation?
In order to address the first question, we take the participation decision as given and compare the choice of a social planner, who maximizes firms' and consumers' total surplus, with the decision implemented by the median voter. 15 Due to the contestability of the market, shops will always make zero profits. We can, therefore, focus on the consumer surplus.
Suppose that the decision about the labor market participation has already been made and that the family with the lowest second income earns y o ; i.e. the share of double income families is 
where d d R = and d LF = 0. By comparing the surplus under the two scenarios, we can determine whether laissez faire or regulation leads to a higher welfare for consumers and shop owners:
With a median voter in charge, both of the following failures in regulatory policy can occur.
Shops may be open too long or shops may be inefficiently restricted in their opening hours. In order to illustrate the potential inefficiencies, we use the diagrammatic exposition in Figure 3 .
The horizontal axis denotes the share of double income families s; the vertical axis measures the costs and benefits of regulation. The private cost of regulation is d for each double income family (and zero for a single income household). The social cost of regulation is illustrated by the upward sloping line d s ⋅ . The benefit of regulation comes from the price reduction ∆p.
Since the price differential is concave in the share of double income families s, the benefit of regulation can be expected to be concave as well. 16 The type of failure in the regulatory policy depends on the sensitivity of the price level to the share of double income families. All feasible cases are illustrated in Figure 3 . 
VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis suggests that both the regulation of shopping hours and a laissez-faire policy can be inefficient regimes if determined through the political process. Double income families, whose time constraint for shopping is tight under regulation, generate a positive shopping externality for all consumers and, therefore, allow for the case of an inefficient laissez-faire policy. Furthermore, we show that regulation may generate repercussions on the households' labor supply decision. In fact, Ferris (1991) finds a statistically significant negative relationship between women's labor participation and shops' opening hours.
Another point we wanted to highlight is the multiplicity of equilibria with respect to regulation. If regulation is anticipated by consumers, this impinges on families' labor market 17 We assume that the second order condition − − − < ∂ ∂ decisions and implicitly changes the relative size of the group which favors regulation. In general, we expect this feedback effect to lead to self-enforcing equilibria.
Finally, we think our approach is useful for emphasizing the fact that socially optimal regulation should not only take into account the costs and benefits of different, currently given, social groups. Prudential regulation should also take into account the fact that the size of these groups is endogenous to the regulation.
SUMMARY
The idea of deregulating shopping hours brings strong opposition from many groups in the society. Surprisingly, even many consumers oppose deregulation. The paper rationalizes this behavior by considering heterogeneous consumers who differ in their earnings abilities. If a majority of families has two income earners, long opening hours become essential and the regulation of shopping hours tends to be eliminated. If most families are single income households, the regulation may be imposed in order to keep prices low. Taking the repercussions on the labor supply decision into account, multiple equilibria can be explained. contre, au cas où les foyers avec un seul salaire dominent, on conservera le règlement pour maintenir les prix bas. Prend on en compte les effets des différents règlements sur la décision de l'offre du travail, on peut ainsi mettre en évidence de multiples équilibres.
